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Abstract: In a spatial common agency model, two asymmetric interest groups (prin-
cipals) inuence a unique decision-maker (agent). The decision-maker chooses a one-
dimensional policy on behalf of those principals and has private information about his
ideology after contracting with principals. The policy is always e¢ cient and reects a
weighted average between the principals and the agents ideal points. The decision-
makers expected rent can be fully extracted by congruent interest groups but not when
interest groupsobjectives are too conicting. The degree of congruence is endogenous. It
depends on the level of ideological uncertainty, whether interest groups can easily buy in-
uence or not, and on their relative ideological distance with the principal. In particular,
the game of inuence is biased towards the closest principal. This suggests that free-entry
equilibria of a lobbying game may only reect the full diversity of the lobbying groups
preferences when there is enough ideological uncertainty and when those groups are close
to be equally distant to the decision-maker.
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1 Introduction
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994),1 it is by now common to rely on the so-called
common agency model of politics to analyze the inuence of interest groups in the polit-
ical arena. In that paradigm, competing lobbying groups (the principals) design non-
cooperatively policy contingent contributions to inuence a common decision-maker (the
agent). The decision-maker chooses which contributions to accept and then which policy
to implement in response to those contributions.
Under complete information, this decentralized political process reaches e¢ ciency, i.e.,
the aggregate payo¤ of the grand-coalition made of all principals and their common agent
is maximized. E¢ ciency comes of course at no surprise. Some version of the Coase The-
orem applies and the overall bargaining between interest groups and the decision-maker
should be e¢ cient. In fact, the game of inuence between interest groups only matters
in so far that it might generate di¤erent distributions of the political surplus between the
di¤erent interest groups and the decision-maker. Although, they all implement the same
e¢ cient allocation once enough concavity is assumed, there may exist a whole multiplicity
of equilibria of the common agency game which di¤ers in terms of these distributions. In
complete information environments, the equilibrium distributions of the surplus are read-
ily characterized by means of simple inequalities (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Laussel
and Le Breton, 2001). Such characterization matters for two reasons. First, it helps to
nd reasons why political principals may pit one group against the others and withdraw
some rent from the political process. Second, this characterization delineates also condi-
tions under which entering the political process is a valuable strategy for interests groups,
in particular when they face a xed-cost of entry as argued by Mitra (1999). This payo¤
characterization provides thus a way to endogenize the active groups in the polity. This
is an important insight to conrm or not the pluralistic view of politics which has been
pushed forward by a whole branch of the political science literature mainly associated
with Dahl (1961).
However, little is known about payo¤ characterization in incomplete information en-
vironments.2 The characterization of the interest groupspayo¤s under ideological uncer-
tainty is an important step of the analysis of entry in the political arena. Indeed, interest
groups exert inuence in an environment plagued by much economic uncertainty on the
exact policy that political decision-makers would like to follow.3
Following most of the political science literature,4 we are interested in describing the
1See also Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
2Laussel and Le Breton (1998) provides such characterization in the context of public good provision.
3Horn (1995).
4See Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) among others.
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equilibrium behavior of two interest groups and a decision-maker all having spatial pref-
erences with ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space. To describe competition for
the agents services, competing interest groups have ideal points located asymmetrically
on each side of the agents ideal point. To model some form of private information, the
agent learns his own ideal point in the policy space after contracting with principals. This
is meant to capture the uncertainty on the ideological bias of key decision-makers in the
political process. Principals non-cooperatively design contributions not only to inuence
the agents choice as it would be the case under complete information, but also may want
to do so to elicit the decision-makers ideal points.
Under ex ante contracting, principals can commit themselves to contributions before
the agent learns his ideal point. Contracting takes thus place under symmetric but incom-
plete information. Indeed, interest groups exert pressures at various stages of the policy
process. Key policy-makers (like Congressmen or civil servants) are often subject to the
inuence of lobbying groups at the policy inception stage, i.e., ex ante before they learn
their most preferred policy.5 The equilibrium policy which results from these pressures
reects the relative political power of interest groups and how e¤ective is their inuence
on the political process.
Because of symmetric information at the contracting stage, the equilibrium outcome
remains always e¢ cient, whatever the realization of the agents ideal point. Equilibrium
contributions are truthful, i.e., reect the principalsmarginal preferences on policy.6 With
truthful contributions, principals compete to attract the agents services by playing on
the xed-fees of those schedules since marginal contributions are fully determined by the
principalspreferences only. Whether there is erce conict or more congruence between
principals depends on the parameters of the model:
 The extent of ideological uncertainty. When there is little ideological uncertainty com-
pared to the degree of polarization, interest groups compete head-to-head for the decision-
makers services. The latter enjoys some positive ex ante rent out of the political process
by playing one principal against the other. Instead, when ideological uncertainty is more
severe, interest groups jointly extract the decision-makers expected rent and appropriate
the whole surplus of the political process.
 The ideological bias of the decision-maker. When the decision-maker is more ideologic-
ally motivated, contributions are less useful and the decision-maker does not get any rent.
On the contrary if the agent is easier to bribe he might appropriate part of the political
surplus.
 The degree of asymmetry between the principals. The more asymmetric are the principals
5See Martimort and Semenov (2006) for the case of ex-post contracting.
6A similar result has also been obtained in a public good context by Laussel and Le Breton (1998).
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the easier it is for the decision-maker to pit one against the other. The more ideologically
distant interest groups get hurt by this competition and, as a result, might prefer to stay
out of the political process in model where entry is endogenous.
2 The Model
Two principals P1 and P2 simultaneously o¤er contributions to inuence a decision-maker
(or common agent). Those principals can be thought of as two legislative committees
willing to inuence a common bureaucrat (a regulatory agency for instance) or as two
lobbying groups dealing with an elected political decision-maker. We denote by q 2 R a
one-dimensional policy parameter over which the decision-maker has control. This can
be a regulated price, an import tari¤ or an export subsidy, a wage level or a number of
permits depending on the application that one has in mind. Principal Pi (i = 1; 2) has a
quasi-linear utility function over policies and monetary transfers ti which is given by:
Vi(q; ti) =  1
2
(q   ai)2   ti:
The parameter ai is Pis ideal point in the one-dimensional policy space. We consider
an asymmetric environment so that principals ideal points are asymmetrically located
around the origin, a1 = a + h and a2 =  a.7 These parameters a and h can be viewed
respectively as the degree of polarization and a measure of the decision-makers bias
towards principal 2. The common agent has similar quasi-linear preferences:
U
 
q;
2X
i=1
ti; 
!
=  
2
(q   )2 +
2X
i=1
ti:
The agents ideal point  is uniformly distributed on an interval  = [ ; ]; centered
around zero.8  measures the degree of the ideological uncertainty. The non-negative
parameter  characterizes how the agent trades o¤ contributions against his own ideo-
logical bias. As  increases, the agent values less monetary transfers and puts more
emphasis on ideology.
Interest groups inuence the decision-maker by o¤ering nonlinear contributions ti(q)
which specify a monetary transfer to the agent depending on the decision q he takes.
These contributions might serve not only to inuence the decision-maker but also to elicit
his ideology.
Timing: We consider a game of delegated common agency where the agent may choose
7We assume a; h  0:
8In much of the literature following Grossman and Helpman (1994), this ideal point is viewed as the
welfare-maximizing policy and our model is consistent with this interpretation as well.
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to accept whatever set of contributions maximizes his payo¤. Under ex ante contracting
the common agency game unfolds as follows.
 Interest groups non-cooperatively make their o¤ers ti(q) to the agent.
 The agent decides whether to accept or refuse each of these o¤ers. If he refuses all
o¤ers, he gets his status quo payo¤ normalized at zero.9
 The agent learns his preferences parameter .
 Finally, the agent chooses the policy q and receives the corresponding payments from
the principals whose o¤ers have been accepted.
Benchmark: The optimal rst-best policy qFB() which maximizes the grand-coalition
payo¤ satises:
qFB() = argmax
q2R
(
2X
i=1
Vi(q; ti) + U
 
q;
2X
i=1
ti; 
!)
=
 + h
 + 2
: (1)
As the decision-makers ideology matters more (i.e.,  increases), the optimal policy is
shifted towards the agents ideal point. Political principals nd it more di¢ cult to inu-
ence the agent as his ideological bias increases. Nevertheless, this policy always reects
also the existing groupspreferences. As h > 0; the e¢ cient policy is biased towards P1s
ideal point.
3 Truthful Equilibria
Let us denote by U() the agents payo¤ when he accepts both principalscontributions
ft1(); t2()g and q() the corresponding optimal policy chosen by the agent, namely:
U() = max
q2R
(
2X
i=1
ti(q)  
2
(q   )2
)
and q() = argmax
q2R
(
2X
i=1
ti(q)  
2
(q   )2
)
:
Similarly, the rent-output prole fUi(); qi()g implemented had the agent only accepted
principal Pis contribution is dened as:
Ui() = max
q2R

ti(q)  
2
(q   )2

and qi() = argmax
q2R

ti(q)  
2
(q   )2

:
The following Lemma characterizes the implementable prole fU(); q()g.
Lemma 1 : U() and q () are a.e. di¤erentiable with, at any di¤erentiability point,
_U () =  (q ()  ) ; q ()  0: (2)
9It is important to stress that the agents outside opportunity if he refuses all contributions is in fact
his payo¤ if he chooses his own ideal policy.
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Principal Pis best-response to any contribution t i() o¤ered by P i and accepted by
the agent must generate a rent-output prole which solves the following problem:
(Pi) : maxfq();U()g
Z 
 

 1
2
(q()  ai)2   
2
(q()  )2 + t i(q())  U()

d
2
subject to (2), andZ 
 
U()
d
2
 max

0;
Z 
 
U i()
d
2

: (3)
The participation constraint (3) stipulates that the agent prefers to take both contracts
rather than either accepting only P is o¤er or refusing both contributions. Because
contracting takes place ex ante, this participation constraint is written in terms of the
agents ex ante rent
R 
  U()
d
2
.
Under ex ante contracting, principal Pis best-response to any contract t i() is simply
to make the decision-maker residual claimant for the aggregate payo¤ of the bilateral
coalition they form so that the latter chooses the right policy whatever the realization of
his ideal point. This is done by o¤ering the following truthful contribution
ti(q) =  1
2
(q   ai)2   Ci; for some Ci 2 R:
The constant Ci is in fact principal Pis payo¤ for any realization of . Using this remark,
we may look for equilibria in truthful schedules.10
To characterize these equilibrium payo¤s, we now dene the aggregate surplus of a
coalition made of principals belonging to any set S 2 f1; 2; f1; 2gg and the common agent
when his ideal point is  as:
WS() = max
q2R
 1
2
(X
i2S
(q   ai)2 + (q   )2
)
:
Then let WS be the expected total surplus of such a coalition: WS =
R 
 WS()
d
2
: The
properties of the cooperative game with characteristic function WS are important to
understand the equilibrium distributions of payo¤s between the principals and their agent
under ex ante contracting.11 Congruent principals are able to jointly extract the ex
9See La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2) for instance.
10Bernheim and Whinston (1986) suggested to focus on the so-called truthful contributions in deleg-
ated common agency games of complete information which are of the form ti(q) = maxf0;  12 (q  ai)2  
Cig; for some Ci 2 R: The notion of truthful contribution is still relevant under ex ante contracting but
must be slightly amended to relax the non-negativity assumption. Although innocuous under complete
information, this assumption would actually preclude e¢ ciency under ex ante contracting. In fact, under
ex ante contracting, the optimal contribution solving (Pi) will make the agent residual claimant for max-
imizing principal Pis objective. Satisfying altogether the incentive constraint (2) and the participation
constraint (3) may require having the agent pay the principal for some realizations of  (e.g. when their
ideal points are far apart).
11This point was already stressed by Laussel and Le Breton (2001).
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agents ante rent whereas principals with conicting preferences will not. In our model,
the congruence between principals is however endogenous and depends on the parameters
of the model.
4 Results and Implications
We now summarize the main features of truthful equilibria under ex ante contracting.
Proposition 1 : For any degree of ideological uncertainty , the decision qea () taken by
the agent is always e¢ cient from the grand-coalitions viewpoint, qea () = qFB () ; 8 2
:
Congruent Principals: Assume that   (a; h; ) =
q
3(+2)

(a+ h) a+ 3h
2
2
. The
agent gets no ex ante rent at any truthful equilibrium. The set of truthful equilibrium
payo¤s (C1; C2) for the principals is an interval dened by the following linear constraints:
C1 + C2 = W12; Wi  Ci;
Wi =  

 
3a2i + 
2

6 ( + 1)
; and W12 =  a (a+ h)  ( + 1)h
2
2( + 2)
  
2
3 ( + 2)
:
Conicting Principals: Assume that  < (a; h; ). The agent gets a positive rent in
the unique truthful equilibrium:Z 
 
U()
d
2
=
2X
i=1
Wi  W12 > 0:
The principals P1 and P2 get the following expected payo¤s in this equilibrium
C1 = W12 W2 = C2 h(2a+ h)
2 ( + 1)
 C2; and C2 = W12 W1 =  3 (a ( + 2) + h)
2 + 22
6 ( + 1) ( + 2)
:
The rst important result of Proposition 1 is that the equilibrium policy is always
e¢ cient from the grand-coalitions viewpoint. Ex post asymmetric information does not
undermine e¢ ciency under ex ante contracting thanks to the fact that each interest group
can make the decision-maker residual claimant for the consequences of the policy on their
bilateral payo¤. Our e¢ ciency result is reminiscent of the literature on common agency
under complete information but is slightly more subtle. Under complete information,
contributions can be tailored to the realized state of nature  and without loss of generality
can be restricted to be non-negative. This is no longer the case under ex ante contracting.
The xed-fees of each principals contribution cannot be conditioned on , making it more
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di¢ cult to ensure that the grand-coalition of principals always forms and thus that the
e¢ cient policy ends up being chosen by the agent.12 Nevertheless, the constants C1 and
C2 can be chosen so that none of the principals wants to deviate away from a common
representation and induce thereby the agent to serve him exclusively. As a result, the
grand-coalition still forms.
Turning now to the distribution of the political surplus, the second important result
of our analysis is that the nature of the conict between interest groups changes with the
extent of ideological uncertainty, the degree of polarization and the degree of asymmetrical
between groups. As uncertainty shrinks or principals are more polarized, the agents ideal
point is better known to be located around zero and certainly always far away from the
principalsown ideal points since principals are signicantly biased on both sides of the
policy space. Principals compete head-to-head for the agents services.13
When ideological uncertainty is more pronounced or when the degree of polarization is
small enough, principals jointly succeed in extracting the agents ex ante rent. Lobbying
competition is somewhat weakened since now principals become more congruent. There
is now always a positive probability that both principalsideal points lie on the same side
of the agents ideal point. On average, principals look more alike. The existing di¤erence
between the principals ideal points is now o¤set by their common willingness to limit
the agents ex ante rent. However, doing so entails now a coordination problem. Many
possible ways of sharing the political surplus are available as long as the agents deviations
towards serving exclusively one of those principals are prevented.
For a xed level of uncertainty, the more pronounced is the bias parameter towards
one principal, the more likely it is that principals are conicting ((a; h; ) increases
with h). As it can be seen from the expressions for the payo¤s Ci, the principal P1 who
is ideologically far away from the decision-maker su¤ers more from the asymmetry.
Let us now suppose that entry in the lobbying process is endogenous, at least for
P2 who may face some extra cost k of entering the political arena. When inactive, this
interest group su¤ers from the policy of the complementary coalition being implemented.
There is a threshold k beyond which entry wont occur. This cut-o¤ decreases with the
extent of ideological uncertainty or with the ideological bias of the decision-maker, and it
12See the Appendix.
13To build intuition, we might think about the extreme case where the agents ideal policy is known for
sure ( = 0). The two principals being symmetrically located around the agents ideal policy, none of them
can really succeed in inducing the agent to choose a policy close enough to his own ideal point even though
each principal is ready to signicantly bid for doing so. As ideological uncertainty slightly increases,
the same head-to-head competition still prevails. Under ex ante contracting, lobbying competition has
no impact on the policy chosen which remains e¢ cient as a result of the agent being o¤ered truthful
contributions. The only impact of head-to-head competition is that the agent gets most of the surplus
of the political process by threatening each principal to deal only with the other. As a result, the agent
secures a positive ex ante rent at equilibrium.
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increases with the asymmetry bias.
This shows that the pluralistic view of politics is warranted only in environments
where ideological uncertainty is more pronounced and groups are close to be symmetrically
located at an equal distance of the decision-maker.
5 Appendix
 Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is standard and thus omitted.
 Proof of Proposition 1: Note that ti(q) =  12(q   ai)2   Ci is a contribution which
is accepted by the common agent as long as Ci is small enough, so that the participation
constraints (3) is satised. The corresponding condition is explicit below.
For the time being note that such truthful schedule satises also the incentive con-
straints in Lemma 1 and is thus a best-response to the truthful schedule o¤ered by P i.
Given that both principals o¤er truthful schedules, the agent chooses an e¢ cient policy
qea() = qFB() = argmax
q2R
(
 
2X
i=1
1
2
(q   ai)2   
2
(q   )2  
2X
i=1
Ci
)
=
 + h
 + 2
:
At a best-response, principal Pi increases Ci up to the point where (3) binds. This
yields the following condition:
W12  
2X
i=1
Ci = maxf0;Wi   Cig; for i = 1; 2: (A1)
For further references, note that
W12() =  a (a+ h)  ( + 1)h
2
2( + 2)
   (   h)
 + 2
; and Wi() =   
2 ( + 1)
(ai   )2:
Taking expectations, we have
W12 =  a (a+ h)  ( + 1)h
2
2( + 2)
  
2
3 ( + 2)
; and Wi =  

 
3a2i + 
2

6 ( + 1)
: (A2)
 The functionWS is superadditive if and only ifW12 >
P2
i=1 Wi or  >
q
3(+2)

(a+ h) a+ 3h
2
2
:
 When uncertainty on the agents ideal point is large enough, there exists a continuum
of truthful equilibria with payo¤s for the principals (C1; C2) satisfying (A1), or to put it
di¤erently:
C1 + C2 = W12; and Wi  Ci  W12  W i: (A3)
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Note that, for any of those equilibria, the agents ex ante rent is zero.
 When  
q
3(+2)

(a+ h) a+ 3h
2
2
, i.e., when uncertainty on the agents ideal point is
small enough, we have W12  W1 +W2 and WS is subadditive. The unique solution to
(A1) is then
Ci = W12  W i: (A4)
 Let us show now that the agent always choose to take both contracts, i.e., given that
P i o¤ers himself a truthful schedule such that W12   Wi  C i, Pi cannot protably
deviate by inducing the agent to serve him exclusively.
The rst observation is that, under ex ante contracting, the payo¤ for Pi of inducing
an exclusive deviation from the agent such that the agent serves this principal only is
weakly dominated by the solution to the following problem:
(Pedi ) : maxfqi();Ui()g
Z 
 

 1
2
(qi()  ai)2   
2
(qi()  )2   Ui()

d
2
subject to(A5)
_Ui () =  (qi ()  ) ; _qi ()  0: (A5)
and Z 
 
Ui()
d
2
 max

0;
Z 
 
U i()
d
2

: (A6)
Indeed, Pis payo¤ Cedi of inducing an exclusive deviation can only be lower that the
maximal payo¤ ~Ci achieved at a solution to (Pedi ) since we have neglected a constraint
saying that the agent should prefer to take only Pis o¤er than both contracts.
Note then that the incentive compatibility constraints (A5) are satised at no cost
when Pi o¤ers also a truthful schedule ti(q) =  12(q  ai)2   ~Ci since it aligns the agents
objectives with those of the bilateral coalition he forms with this principal. Given that
P i o¤ers also a truthful contribution t i(q) =  12(q a i)2 C i, the maximal payo¤ ~Ci
is achieved when (A6) is binding, i.e., Wi   ~Ci = maxf0;W i   C ig: Two cases should
now be considered.
Congruent principals: Then,W1+W2  W12. We know that C i  W12 Wi and thus
~Ci  Wi but from (A3), ~Ci is dominated by the payo¤ with a common representation.
Conicting principals: Then, W1 +W2 > W12. We know that C i = W12  Wi and
thus ~Ci  W12   W i but from (A4), ~Ci is dominated by the payo¤ with a common
representation.
In both cases, deviations to an exclusive representation are always dominated.
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